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HANDLING HOT POTATOES: JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES AFTER SENATE V.
JONES
Gerald F. Uelmen*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 13, 1999, in Senate v. Jones,' the California
Supreme Court removed an initiative measure from the ballot
because it did not comply with the constitutional requirement
that an initiative measure embrace no more than one
subject.! The "single subject" requirement had been a part of
the California Constitution since 1948, and dozens of
initiatives had been challenged in the California Supreme
Court on the ground that they violated this requirement. Yet
Jones was the first time the California Supreme Court had
ever invalidated an initiative because it embraced more than
one subject.
Meanwhile, the initiative process achieved total
domination of the California political scene. Every discussion
or debate of public policy, including California's current crisis
over the shortage of electrical power, is haunted by the
specter of an initiative to "settle" the debate. More often,
initiatives create more questions than they resolve, and those
questions then take another initiative to provide answers.
The initiative has thus become a fourth branch of
government, with its own industrial complex available to
draft and qualify measures on a recurring basis. Like the
carnivorous plant in the movie Little Shop of Horrors,3 the
* J.D., LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Loyola
Marymount University. The author is a Professor of Law, Santa Clara
University School of Law.
1. 21 Cal. 4th 1142 (1999).
2. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
3. LITTLE SHOP OF HORRORS (Warner Bros. 1986).
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initiative industry opens its mouth in anticipation of every
election, says "feed me!," and then grows larger. Each time
Californians go to the polls, they expect to encounter a dozen
ballot propositions, to determine questions as basic as who
should go to jail, who should be executed, who should pay
taxes and how much they should pay, and who can marry
whom. Initiative contests become the political battleground
where trial lawyers shoot it out with insurance companies,
prosecutors face off against criminal defense lawyers, the
religious right confronts the gay rights movement, and
environmentalists take on polluters.
In this setting, a decision like Jones might be likened to
Marbury v. Madison.4  Chief Justice John Marshall's
pronouncement that legislation which violated the
Constitution could be struck down by the courts began two
centuries of dialogue between the legislative and judicial
branches. Today, legislatures are well aware that when they
enact laws, they must keep one eye on the constitutional
interpretations emanating from the courts. For too long, the
California initiative industry has remained largely oblivious
to the two most significant limitations on the power of the
initiative contained in the California Constitution: the
prohibition of constitutional revision by initiative, and the
requirement that initiatives address a single subject. The
decision in Jones merits careful study by those who draft and
promote initiatives. It may be the harbinger of a new level of
judicial scrutiny of their handiwork.
II. THE CROCODILES IN THE BATHTUB
As a legal matter, initiatives are entitled to no greater
deference than any other legislative enactment. As former
Chief Justice Warren Burger put it, "[Tihe voters may no
more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure
than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation."5
But as a practical matter, elected judges considering a
popular initiative must face the same voters who enacted it to
keep their judicial seats. Former Justice Joseph Grodin of
the California Supreme Court once described these cases as
"hot potatoes," explaining, "It is one thing for a court to tell a
4. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. Citizens against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981).
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legislature that a statute it has adopted is unconstitutional;
to tell that to the people of a state who have indicated their
direct support for the measure through the ballot is another."'
After an election, judges who strike down an initiative
adopted by the voters face the accusation that they have
flouted the "will of the people." Often, the promoters of the
invalidated initiative will then train their sights on the
judges themselves, mobilizing initiative supporters to
challenge the retention of the judges who voted to strike the
initiative down.
California has seen more than its share of supreme court
retention election challenges fueled by frustrated initiative
supporters. In 1966, shortly before newly appointed Chief
Justice Roger Traynor appeared on the election ballot, he
authored an opinion striking down Proposition 14, an
initiative declaring that Californians had the right to
discriminate on the basis of race in the sale of their property.7
Traynor was widely denounced by the press and politicians,
and many newspaper editorials urged his rejection at the
polls. He was retained by a vote of sixty-five percent in 1966,
a smaller margin than any previous vote of affirmation
received by a Justice of the California Supreme Court. Four
years earlier, Traynor had received a retention vote of 89.7%.
Similar low returns were posted by the justices who joined
Traynor in the Proposition 14 opinion. Justice Paul Peek, for
example, was retained by a sixty-two percent vote, even
though he had been confirmed only two years before by an
eighty-eight percent margin.'
In 1982, after voters adopted a wide-ranging criminal
justice initiative in June (Proposition 8), much of the
campaign rhetoric for the November supreme court retention
elections was focused upon a case pending before the supreme
court challenging the validity of the initiative. Four of the
seven Justices were due to appear on the ballot that
November: Justices Broussard, Kaus, Reynoso, and
Richardson. (Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk and
Newman were not on the ballot that year). Senatorial
candidate Pete Wilson announced that he would personally
6. JOSEPH GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 105 (1989).
7. See Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529 (1966), affd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
8. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections in California,
28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 341 (1988).
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oppose any Justice who voted to strike down Proposition 8. A
challenge to the initiative had been dismissed prior to its
enactment in Brosnahan v. Eu [Brosnahan ], with a four to
three majority concluding that review of the constitutional
issues should await the June election. Two of the three
dissenters, however, expressed the opinion that the measure
violated the constitutional requirement that an initiative
measure address a "single subject."" Thus, there was
widespread speculation that the court would invalidate the
measure. On September 2, 1982, the court handed down
Brosnahan v. Brown [Brosnahan II]," a four to three opinion
upholding the initiative. Only Justice Broussard joined Chief
Justice Bird and Justice Mosk in dissenting.
The majority opinion in Brosnahan II, authored by
Justice Frank Richardson, reaffirmed the "reasonably
germane" standard for compliance with the single subject
requirement, 2 and roundly rejected a further requirement
that the several provisions of a measure be
"interdependent."'3 In previously upholding Proposition 13,
the revolutionary limitation on property tax rates and
restrictions on local taxing authority enacted in 1978, the
court had noted that the various tax provisions were
"interdependent" and "interlocking."'4 Brosnahan I makes it
clear, however, that such interdependence is not a
constitutional prerequisite. All that is necessary is that a
general subject or common concern unite all of the parts. The
court found that common theme in the measure's promotion
of the rights of actual or potential crime victims, which even
embraced a declaration that public school students and staff
have an "inalienable right" to attend campuses which are
"safe, secure and peaceful."" Justice Richardson also
9. 31 Cal. 3d 1 (1982).
10. See id. at 5 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 14 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). The "single subject" requirement is contained in article II, section
8(d) of the California Constitution.
11. 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982).
12. An initiative measure does not violate the single subject requirement if
all of its parts are reasonably germane to each other. See Fair Political
Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 33, 38-39 (1979); Perry v.
Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87, 90-92 (1949).
13. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 248-49.
14. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 231 (1978).
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
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dismissed a claim that the initiative was an example of
"logrolling," whereby certain groupings of voters, each
constituting a minority, are combined to produce an
aggregate majority by combining disparate provisions, none of
which would command a majority in isolation. He stated, "It
is highly unlikely that Proposition 8 was the product of any
logrolling whatever, because it contains no 'unnatural
combination' of provisions on unrelated subjects which might
suggest an inordinate vote-getting scheme on behalf of the
proponents. '' " Despite the decision upholding the
controversial initiative, the Republican Party State Central
Committee endorsed the "nonconfirmation" of Justices Kaus
and Reynoso, as well as Justice Broussard, in the November
election. 7 The following November, these three Justices were
narrowly confirmed, by margins of 56.3% for Broussard, 57%
for Kaus, and 52.4% for Reynoso. Justice Richardson, on the
other hand, was confirmed by a comfortable margin of
76.2%.18 Subsequently, Justice Otto Kaus candidly reflected
that he remained uncertain in his own mind whether
campaign rhetoric had a subliminal impact on his decision in
the case. 9 He used a marvelous metaphor to describe the
dilemma of deciding controversial cases while facing
reelection, saying that it was like finding a crocodile in your
bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it
is there, and even though you try not to think about it, it is
hard to think about much else while you are shaving."
Although many commentators attributed the decision in
Brosnahan II to the overheated political context in which it
was decided, Professor Daniel Lowenstein published a strong
defense of the decision "to demonstrate that the majority
ruling was legally sound and therefore need not be regarded
as an instance of political cowardice."'" Defending the
"reasonably germane" test as clear enough to deal with
"wildly diverse" initiatives, he nonetheless proposed a "gloss"
16. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 251.
17. See Unger v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 612 (1985).
18. See L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 4, 1982, § 1, at 1.
19. See L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1986, § 1, at 3; Grodin, Judicial Elections: The
California Experience, JUDICATURE, Apr.-May 1987, at 365, 368.
20. See Gerald F. Uelmen, Otto Kaus and the Crocodile, 30 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 971 (1997).
21. Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single Subject
Rule, 30 UCLA L. REV. 936, 938 n.13 (1983).
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on the standard, calling upon the courts to inquire into the
"public understanding" of the relationship among the various
parts of a complex initiative. Rather than looking to the text
of the initiative alone, the courts could look to evidence such
as published media or opinion polls to see if the public
perceived some prior relationship among the parts. Thus, he
concludes, an initiative that might fail the "reasonably
germane" test at one point in time, might pass it at another.
"For example, a measure dealing with air and water
pollution, conservation of gasoline, and disposal of toxic
wastes might have violated the single subject rule in the
1950s, but should be upheld today in light of increased
environmental consciousness."2
Brosnahan I became the leading California case on the
availability of pre-election review of initiatives, and
Brosnahan II became a leading California case on the
meaning of the single subject limitation. This pair of
crocodiles still resides in our bathtub, but Jones may have
allayed their capacity to disturb a morning shave.
III. SENATE V. JONES
Jones presented a pre-election challenge to Proposition
24, an initiative measure entitled the "Let the Voters Decide
Act of 2000." The measure would have amended the
California Constitution to reduce the salaries of legislators
and require voter approval of any increases, as well as
require the supreme court to adopt plans for the decennial
reapportionment of legislative and congressional districts,
and submit its plans to the voters for approval at the next
general election.
The measure had already qualified to be placed on the
ballot for the March 7, 2000 primary election with over one
million signatures, exceeding the requisite number for a
constitutional amendment." The court's description of the
qualification process offers important insights into how the
California initiative industry operates. The proponents
22. Id. at 971.
23. The California Constitution requires petitions signed by eight percent of
the number of those who voted for governor in the last general election to
qualify an initiative measure that amends the constitution. CAL. CONST. art. II,
§ 8(b). An initiative measure that enacts a statute requires petitions signed by
five percent of the number of those who voted for governor in the last general
election.
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actually submitted five different versions of their proposal to
the Secretary of State. All five measures contained a
provision transferring reapportionment power from the
legislature to the supreme court, but varied in terms of the
additional constitutional amendments included. One version,
entitled the "Anti-Corruption Act of 2000," would have
included campaign financing reform; another version, entitled
the "Governmental Reform Act of 2000," would have imposed
a freeze on legislative salaries, rather than a reduction.24
After measuring the level of public support for the various
alternatives, the proponents informed the Secretary of State
that only the legislative pay-cut version would be circulated
for signatures, and the alternative versions would be
withdrawn. The record included a newspaper quotation of
the proponent's explanation for choice of the pay-cut version:
When you go to a mall-I sit there two hours a day-and
ask people if they want to sign a petition to cut legislative
salaries, they say, "where do I sign?" You say you've got a
petition to set up a special master to redistrict-redistrict,
not even reapportionment-they say, "what's that?"
25
Thus, Proposition 24 appears to be a classic example of
"logrolling," whereby the proponents of a new
reapportionment scheme were shopping around for other
"sweeteners" to enhance the prospects of an electoral
majority.
The court in Jones first addressed the propriety of pre-
election review. The strongest argument in favor of pre-
election review was the language of the single subject
prohibition itself. The California Constitution provides that
an initiative embracing more than one subject "may not be
submitted to the voters."26 But Brosnahan I was also a single
subject challenge, and the court denied relief because "it is
usually more appropriate to review constitutional and other
challenges to ballot propositions or initiative measures after
an election rather than to disrupt the electoral process by
preventing the exercise of the people's franchise, in the
absence of some clear showing of invalidity."27 Seizing upon
this language, Chief Justice Ron George's majority opinion in
24. See Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1149 n.2 (1999).
25. Id. at 1151 n.5.
26. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
27. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4-5 (1982) (emphasis added).
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Jones attempts to distinguish Brosnahan L He cites the
subsequent decision in Brosnahan II, which rejected the
single subject challenge, as clear evidence "that a majority of
the court in Brosnahan I was not persuaded that, in that
instance, the challenged initiative violated the single subject
rule."" This overlooks the fact that both cases were four to
three decisions, and the majority which denied pre-election
review in Brosnahan I was not the same majority that upheld
Proposition 8 in Brosnahan II. Justice Broussard joined the
Brosnahan I majority, but concurred in Justice Mosk's
dissent in Brosnahan II, restating the objection that the
single subject rule was violated.29 Justice Newman dissented
in Brosnahan I, then joined the majority in Brosnahan 11, but
never offered any explanation for either vote. Chief Justice
George's analysis of the Brosnahan precedents also overlooks
the shift in positions between Brosnahan I and Brosnahan II.
In Brosnahan I, the single subject suggested by the initiative
proponents was "public safety." In Brosnahan II, when the
initiative was being defended by the Attorney General, the
single subject became the protection of victims of crime. °
The real explanation for rejecting Brosnahan I as
precedent appears to be the subsequent limitation of the rule
against pre-election review to challenges to the substance of
initiative measures.' This was precisely the position taken
by Justice Stanley Mosk in his dissent to Brosnahan I. If the
measure fails to comply with procedures required to qualify
for the ballot, it should not be submitted to the voters." Chief
Justice George concludes that delaying a decision against the
validity of an initiative until after the election confuses and
frustrates the voters, and "tends to denigrate the legitimate
use of the initiative procedure."33
28. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1154.
29. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 299 (1982) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
30. See id. at 273. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
31. See Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1153 (citing American Fed'n of Labor v. Eu, 36
Cal. 3d 687 (1984); Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658 (1983)).
32. See Brosnahan, 31 Cal. 3d at 6-8.
33. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1154. Dissenting Justice Joyce Kennard, joined by
Justice Janice Rogers Brown, argues that "extraordinary circumstances" were
presented in prior cases where pre-election review was permitted, and relies
upon Brosnahan v. Eu for the proposition that the language of article II, section
8(d) of the California Constitution does not mandate pre-election review of
single subject challenges. See id. at 1169 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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Turning to the merits of the single subject challenge, the
majority articulates the same standard applied in Brosnahan
II, that all of the parts must be "reasonably germane" to each
other.34 Conceding that this standard rarely leads to a finding
that the rule was violated, the court found significant
guidance in two recent decisions of the courts of appeal which
struck down initiatives because they violated the single
subject rule.
IV. REDEFINING THE SINGLE SUBJECT STANDARD
In California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Eu,35 the Third
District Court of Appeal, in a pre-election challenge, struck
down an initiative entitled the "Insurance Cost Control
Initiative of 1988." The measure, proposed by the insurance
industry, combined a complex "no fault" insurance reform
with a provision stating that no law restricting campaign
contributions could be stricter or easier on insurance
companies, consumer groups, or trade associations than on
citizens as a whole. The court ruled that the campaign
contribution provision was not reasonably germane to
controlling the cost of insurance. It rejected the proponent's
argument that regulation of the insurance industry was the
single subject, finding an umbrella that encompassed any
aspect of the business of insurance too broad. The court
concluded this approach "would permit the joining of
enactments so disparate as to render the constitutional single
subject limitation nugatory." 6  The proponents then
circulated a new version of the initiative without the
offending provision. The measure was defeated in the
November 1988 election.
In Chemical Specialties Manufacturer's Ass'n v.
Deukmejian,37 the court invalidated an initiative entitled the
"Public's Right to Know Act," adopted as Proposition 105 in
the November 1988 election. The measure mandated public
disclosure of information related to (1) household toxic
products, (2) seniors' health insurance, (3) nursing homes, (4)
statewide initiative or referendum campaigns, and (5) sales of
stock or securities for corporations doing business with South
34. See Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1157 (citing Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 245).
35. 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1988).
36. Id. at 921.
37. 278 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1991).
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Africa. The court rejected the "single subject" of "public
disclosure" or "truth in advertising" as so broad and general
that it could justify the inclusion of an unlimited array of
provisions and obliterate the single subject requirement.38
Looking to these precedents, the supreme court in Jones
defined the issue of compliance with the single subject
requirement in terms of its underlying purposes, to prevent
joinder of disparate measures for improper tactical purposes
(i.e. "logrolling") and to minimize voter confusion and
deception. The proponents of the "Let the Voters Decide Act
of 2000" argued that, since both the legislative pay cut and
the reapportionment scheme required that the voters approve
of pay raises and reapportionment plans, "voter approval"
was an appropriate single subject that united the measure.
The court found this analogous to the "public disclosure"
theme asserted in Chemical Specialties, which was "so broad
that a virtually unlimited array of provisions could be
considered germane thereto and joined in this proposition,
essentially obliterating the constitutional requirement."39
Alternatively, the proponents argued the legislative pay
provisions and reapportionment provisions both dealt with
combating the "self interest of individual legislators," by
requiring voter approval. Here, the court seized upon the
single subject rationale of avoiding voter confusion and
deception, noting that under existing law, legislators do not
control their own salaries, and thus, cannot "raise their own
pay" as the initiative implied. °
When the Jones court attempts to distinguish prior
political reform initiatives that were upheld against single
subject challenges, the opinion is much less persuasive. In
Fair Political Practices Commission v. Superior Court,4
("FPPC") the court upheld a massive reform of campaign
contributions and other political practices and activities as all
related to the common theme of reforming political practices.
No explanation is offered as to why "political practices" is any
narrower than "regulating the insurance industry" or "public
disclosure" in terms of the potential to obliterate the single
38. See id. at 133.
39. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1162 (quoting Chemical Specialties Mfr's. Ass'n,
278 Cal. Rptr. at 133).
40. See id. at 1163.
41. 25 Cal. 3d 33 (1979).
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subject limitation. Furthermore, in Legislature v. Eu,42 the
court rejected a single subject challenge to an initiative
designed to impose term limits, reduce legislative
expenditures, and limit legislative pensions based on the
common theme of "incumbency reform," since all of these
provisions would make "an extended career in public office
both less available and less attractive to incumbent
legislators."43 An umbrella as large as "incumbency reform"
seems to have just as much potential to render the single
subject limitation nugatory as does "voter approval."
What really distinguishes Jones from both FPPC and Eu
appears to be the element of "public understanding" of the
underlying theme or unifying concept. While Chief Justice
George never articulated this distinction, it appears to
underlie his analysis of the single subject issue in Jones. The
risks of confusion and manipulation which he identifies arise
from the public's ability to perceive and understand some
underlying relationship between reapportionment and
legislative salaries, apart from the fact that they are
presented in the same package for a vote. The underlying
relationships asserted in FPPC and Eu were fully
comprehensible to the electorate long before the initiatives in
those cases were presented. With respect to Brosnahan II,
however, a much closer question was presented. Professor
Lowenstein, in formulating the test of public understanding,
argued that Proposition 8 would actually have an easier time
meeting the single subject standard under a public
understanding test than under the unmodified "reasonably
germane" test:
More clearly, the measure satisfies the "popular
understanding" test because a substantial element of the
population undoubtedly believes that criminal law should
be restructured to better protect victims and potential
victims; that this protection can be accomplished by
making the law "tougher" on criminal defendants; and
that the desired restructuring can be accomplished by the
type of provisions contained in Proposition 8.4
Reapportionment, on the other hand, is largely perceived by
the public as a partisan political issue unrelated to legislative
42. 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991).
43. Id. at 513.
44. Lowenstein, supra note 21, at 973.
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salaries.
In 1992, the California Commission on Campaign
Financing issued a comprehensive report on the California
initiative process.45 The report recommended retaining the
"reasonably germane" standard to review initiatives for
compliance with the single subject standard, and rejected
Professor Lowenstein's "public understanding" test because of
its "vagueness" and the burden it would impose on the courts
to assess public understanding. It also suggested public
understanding might be "manipulated" by initiative sponsors
prior to placing a measure on the ballot.46 The Commission
then proceeded to suggest that a "conceptual coherence" test
might be worthy of further study, calling for courts to look to
three factors: (1) the likelihood of voter confusion; (2) the
evidence of logrolling; and (3) conceptual coherence, which
could be determined by "whether a 'reasonable voter' would
have been 'surprised' to learn that the specific provisions
being challenged were included in the initiative under
question."47 The first two factors have always been elements
of the "reasonably germane" standard, and were key factors
in the court's decision in Jones. The third factor, however,
seems to be just another way of articulating the element of
public understanding in terms slightly more objective than
Professor Lowenstein's formulation.
Jones does not formulate a new standard for the courts to
measure compliance with the single subject standard. But it
does identify key elements that are likely to distinguish
successful challenges from unsuccessful ones. First, the court
will look to the alternative drafts and other evidence of
"manipulation," which support a claim that "logrolling" is
going on. Second, the court will examine the risks of public
confusion and deception from a very broad perspective that
closely approximates the "public understanding" test
proposed by Professor Lowenstein. For most of the past half
century, the "reasonably germane" standard has proven
toothless. As the court demonstrated in Jones, however, "the
rule is neither devoid of content nor as 'toothless' as some
45. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON CAMPAIGN FINANCING, DEMOCRACY BY
INITIATIVE: SHAPING CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992)
[hereinafter CCCF].
46. See id. at 319.
47. Id. at 320.
1010 [Vol. 41
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legal commentators have suggested."48 What gives it teeth,
however, is the court's willingness to look beyond the
language of the initiative itself in addressing the single
subject issue.
V. THE PROHIBITION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
The court in Jones did not reach the separate contention
that Proposition 24 violated the prohibition against utilizing
the initiative process to accomplish a constitutional
"revision," although the court noted the transfer of the power
of reapportionment from the legislature to the supreme court
would involve "a most fundamental and far-reaching change
in the law."49 This limitation upon the power of the initiative
has a pedigree that reaches back to the beginning of the last
century, when the initiative power was first created. Just
like the single subject rule, however, it has been rarely
employed by the California Supreme Court to invalidate an
initiative measure.
As Governor of California, Hiram Johnson led the 1911
reform movement that gave California the initiative. In
defining the power of the initiative, however, an important
distinction was made between amendment and revision of the
constitution. Johnson's measure provided that initiatives
could only amend the constitution, reserving to a
constitutional convention the power to revise it.5"
Hiram Johnson was well aware of the significance of this
distinction. In 1893, the California Legislature approved a
proposal to change the state constitution by declaring San
Jose the new state capital. Before the proposal could be
submitted to the electorate for a vote, however, a citizen of
Sacramento filed a taxpayer's suit challenging the validity of
the measure. Grove L. Johnson, one of the smartest lawyers
in Sacramento, was retained to take the case to the California
Supreme Court. Johnson, assisted by his twenty-seven-year-
old son and law partner, Hiram, devised a brilliant strategy.
The California Constitution provided two methods for
substantive change: a convention of delegates to revise it, or a
48. Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1158 (1999) (citing Comment, The
California Initiative Process: The Demise of the Single Subject Rule, 14 PAC. L.J.
1095 (1983); Comment, Putting the "Single" Back in the Single Subject Rule: A
Proposal for Initiative Reform in California, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 879 (1991)).
49. Id. at 1142.
50. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
101120011
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proposal enacted by both houses of the legislature to amend
it. The measure moving the capital, they argued, was a
revision of the constitution because it created a special
commission that had to obtain a cash contribution of one
million dollars and locate ten acres of land before the change
could take effect. Creating this external contingency went
beyond the normal power of a mere "amendment." The
supreme court agreed and the state capital remained in
Sacramento.5
By preserving the exclusive power to revise the
constitution for a constitutional convention, Hiram Johnson
put a significant limitation on the potential scope of initiative
measures. He recognized that initiative measures may not be
drafted with the same degree of caution and circumspection
that accompany a constitutional convention. In 1911, there
were still many Californians around who remembered the
careful debate and deliberation that surrounded the
convention of 1878, which extensively revised the California
Constitution. The debates were accurately recorded,
providing exhaustive legislative history to decipher the
intention of the drafters. The debates were also widely
reported in the press, enhancing public awareness of the
issues being decided.
Other states that adopted initiative reform devised a
variety of creative safeguards to preserve their state
constitutions from precipitous change. Nevada requires that
its constitution cannot be amended by initiative unless the
voters approve the initiative twice.52 Nevada passed a tax
reform initiative similar to Proposition 13 in 1978, but two
years later the voters thought less of the idea and defeated
the measure. Six states with provisions for legislation to be
enacted by popular initiative do not permit initiative
measures to amend their state constitutions at all.53
In 1962, the California Constitution was amended to
extend the power to propose revisions of the constitution to
the legislature.54  This change was proposed by a
Constitutional Revision Commission, which was engaged in a
methodical effort to pare down the constitution's unwieldy
51. See Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113 (1894).
52. See NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 4.
53. Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
54. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1. See Bruce Sumner, Constitution Revision
by Commission in California, 1 W. ST. L. REV. 48 (1972).
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length and complexity. The rationale was that the hearings
of the Commission and legislative debates would fulfill the
same functions as a constitutional convention, and that the
resulting proposals would be presented to the electorate
clearly labeled as revisions.
Thus, the preclusion of constitutional revision by
initiatives offers a powerful weapon to the courts to strike
down initiative measures that are too ambitious in proposing
constitutional change. The use of this weapon is hardly anti-
democratic. The will of the people can be expressed with
varying force. The adoption or revision of a constitution is
widely perceived and appreciated as a very solemn expression
of popular will. A commitment to the supremacy of the will of
the people, however, leaves room for the imposition of
procedural obstacles to insure that the people carefully
distinguish their will from their whim.
Should a constitutional change that emerges from an
initiative receive greater judicial deference than one that
emanates from the legislature? The prohibition of
constitutional revision is contained in the same constitution
that proclaims that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people" who enjoy the power to "alter or reform" government
"when the public may require." "
While this may seem at odds with the guarantee of a
republican form of government which appears in the U.S.
Constitution,56 the federal guarantee has relevance only to an
attack mounted under a provision of the federal
Constitution.57 As Professor Julian Eule put it, "Where the
state constitution is the source of a judicial challenge, the
absence of a representational bias and a different
conceptualization of sovereignty render the argument
inappropriate."58 The California courts have hardly spoken
with one voice on this point. Older cases suggest that
initiative measures are entitled to no greater strength or
55. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
56. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
57. In Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the initiative process itself under the
federal constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government, holding it
was a nonjusticiable "political" question.
58. Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1548 (1990).
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dignity than other legislation. 9 Justice Richardson, on the
other hand, who authored Brosnahan 11, argued that
initiatives are entitled to "very special and very favored
treatment."
60
It is here that I would part company with the late
Professor Eule, at least with respect to the argument that an
initiative is a revision rather than a mere amendment of the
constitution. Eule suggested that "the strongest case for
enhanced deference will occur in the states whose
constitutions afford the voters the same direct and
unimpeded access to the amendatory process that they allow
for legislation., 6' He then placed California in this category.
The full significance of the limitation on the power of the
initiative now becomes apparent. It takes on added
importance because of the more recent extension of the power
to propose constitutional revision to the legislature. To say
that a change in the constitution originated by initiative is
entitled to greater deference than a change originated by the
legislature, when the question is whether that change is a
revision, turns the California Constitution on its head. The
constitution itself recognizes the primacy of the legislature
(and the constitutional convention) when it comes to changes
substantial enough to be called "revisions." Thus, scrutiny of
an initiative to determine whether it is a constitutional
revision should not be tempered by deference to "the will of
the people." Just like the federal constitutional guarantee of
a republican form of government, the California Constitution
recognizes a preference for representative democracy, in the
form of a constitutional convention or a legislative enactment,
when it comes to revision of the constitution.
On only two occasions has the California Supreme Court
relied upon the constitutional revision prohibition to strike
down an initiative measure. The first occasion was the 1948
decision in McFadden v. Jordan.62  The supreme court
actually intervened three months prior to the November
election to remove a 21,000 word monstrosity entitled the
"California Bill of Rights" from the ballot. The measure was
cooked up by Willis and Lawrence Allen, who were the
59. See Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 593 (1927).
60. Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 683 (1983).
61. Eule, supra note 58, at 1548.
62. 32 Cal. 2d 330 (1948).
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Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann of their generation. The Allen
brothers were a combination of a little Thomas Jefferson with
a lot of P.T. Barnum. Their "movement" was known as the
"Ham and Eggs" movement. The only "rights" in their "Bill of
Rights" initiative were the right of any organization to use a
public school building for a meeting without paying a fee, and
the right to fish in public waters. The rest of the measure
included a complex retirement pension scheme, and plan for
licensed gambling, a prohibition of taxes on oleomargarine,
the establishment of a "Board of Naturopathic Examiners,"
regulation of strip mining, and some campaign reform
measures.
There was no requirement at the time that initiative
measures relate to a single subject. Concluding that the
extensive changes the measure required in the California
Constitution amounted to a "revision," the California
Supreme Court emphasized that the difference between
"amending" and "revising" was not just quantitative, but
denoted a "field of application appropriate to its procedure."
A constitutional convention was perceived as a "bulwark"
against improvident or hasty change. The multifarious
nature of the initiative was perceived as a transparent
attempt to aggregate the support of a coalition of minority
groups, the same sort of "logrolling" later addressed by the
single subject rule:
The proposal is offered as a single amendment, but it
obviously is multifarious. It does not give the people an
opportunity to express approval or disapproval severally
as to each major change suggested; rather does it,
apparently, have the purpose of aggregating for the
measure the favorable votes from electors of many
suasions who, wanting strongly enough any one or more
propositions offered, might grasp at that which they want,
tacitly accepting the remainder. Minorities favoring each
proposition severally might, thus aggregated, adopt all.
Such an appeal might well be proper in voting on a revised
constitution, proposed under the safeguards provided for
such a procedure, but it goes beyond the legitimate scope
63
of a single amendatory article.
The following November, California voters adopted an
amendment to the state constitution proposed by the
63. Id. at 346.
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legislature to add the single subject requirement for
initiatives. Although motivated by the decision in McFadden
enforcing the prohibition of constitutional revision, the single
subject rule was broader, applying even to measures that
propose only statutory changes. It remains clear, however,
that the single subject rule and the prohibition of
constitutional revision reflect some of the same concerns,
particularly the aversion to "logrolling." Additionally, the
prohibition of constitutional revision can apply even to
measures that do address a single subject. A large number of
changes to the constitution may be "reasonably germane" to
each other, but still bring about such a fundamental change
that they amount to a "revision."
The second case in which the California Supreme Court
struck down an initiative measure as a constitutional revision
was Raven v. Deukmejian.64 While most of Proposition 115, a
sweeping anti-crime initiative, was upheld, the court
invalidated a key clause that would have required all
procedural rights in the California Constitution to be
construed in conformity with the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. In terms of its scope, the clause could only
be compared with the legendary "omnibus repealer," in which
the Arkansas legislature apocryphally enacted a clause
providing, "All laws and parts of laws . . . are hereby
repealed."65 Section three of Proposition 115 would have
added a clause to the California Constitution providing that,
"This constitution shall not be construed by the courts to
afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those
afforded by the Constitution of the United States. . ." In
striking down this provision as a constitutional revision, the
California Supreme Court broke new ground. Conceding that
the quantitative effects "seem no more extensive than those
presented in prior cases,"6 the court based its decision
squarely on the qualitative impact, a fundamental restriction
on judicial power which was described as "devastating."6
The test propounded by Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas was
64. 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990). In the interest of full disclosure, I must note that
I was a named plaintiff in Raven v. Deukmejian, along with Robert Raven.
65. Note, Legislative and Judicial Dynamism in Arkansas: Poisson v.
d'Avril, 22 ARK. L. REV. 724 (1969), reprinted in RODNEY R. JONES & GERALD F.
UELMEN, SUPREME FOLLY 184 (1990).
66. Raven, 52 Cal. 3d at 351.
67. See id. at 353.
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whether a measure makes a fundamental change in our
preexisting governmental plan.68 But defining a revision as a
"fundamental" change simply substitutes one label for
another, providing little guidance for future cases.
In defining "revision," the supreme court should
recognize that legislative or convention deliberation and
debate hold several advantages over the initiative process as
an instrument of change. Initiative measures provide no
opportunity for amendments or corrections, leaving drafting
gaffes to confound the courts. Initiative measures are
presented to the electorate by special interests that are
motivated to obfuscate the real issues behind a barrage of
meaningless labels and slogans. These shortcomings become
most important in the context of complex changes, which
require ongoing interpretation and application.
All of these flaws were abundant in Proposition 115. The
measure was drafted by a committee of prosecutors who
sought no input from scholars or other experts on the
criminal justice system. The "omnibus repealer" clause was
poorly drafted and riddled with ambiguity regarding its
reach. The measure was presented to the public in a media
blitz of coat hangers and gas chambers. It is highly unlikely
the public even understood its potential impact on the state
constitution.
Thus conceived, the prohibition of constitutional revision
by initiative preserves our commitment to rational discourse
before we make important changes in how we govern
ourselves. Rather than offering a label to merely restate a
conclusion, the court should be asking whether the change
the measure accomplishes is significant enough that the
adversary deliberation of a legislative proposal or a
constitutional convention is necessary.
If the prohibition of constitutional revision by initiative is
perceived as a protection of rational discourse preceding
changes with great impact, the legislative term limits
imposed by Proposition 140 presented a close question-much
closer than the decision in Legislature v. Eu 9 indicated.
In rejecting the argument that the term limits and
drastic budget cuts imposed on the legislature were a
constitutional revision, the majority opinion of Chief Justice
68. See id. at 355.
69. 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991).
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Malcolm Lucas relied on two principal arguments. First, he
stressed that construing a limitation of legislative power to be
a revision would insulate the legislature from "reform,"
because only the legislature itself could initiate a "revision" to
accomplish such reform. Second, he dismissed the long-term
consequences of term limits as "simply unfathomable at this
time. 7 °
The first argument creates a double standard which
permits more extensive "reform" of the legislature by
initiative than would be permitted if the target were the
executive or judicial branches. This simply ignores the
structural protection for the legislative branch created by the
constitution itself. Initially, the power to propose "revisions"
was not even conferred on the legislature at all. Only a
constitutional convention was empowered to initiate changes
that amounted to a "revision." The amendment that extended
this power to the legislature was part of a careful plan to
accomplish a redrafting and pruning of a constitution which
had become unwieldy. It did not give the legislature any
greater power to stymie reform, but expanded the available
mechanisms to initiate reform while preserving the need for
careful deliberation.
The conclusion that long-term consequences of the term
limits and budget cuts were "unfathomable" defies reason. It
suggests that if the effects of a fundamental change are
immediate, it is more likely to be a revision than if the
changes are like a time bomb, set to explode in the future.
Courts are constantly engaged in a process of fathoming the
future, every time they construe a statute or a constitutional
provision. One did not need a crystal ball to assess the
impact Proposition 140 would have on the balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches of
government. Because a governor and other executive officers
have up to eight years in office, while the legislative
leadership regularly turns over every two years, the
significant shift of power that occurred was readily
predictable.
To be sure, there were significant differences between the
"omnibus repealer" clause struck down in Proposition 115,
and the term limits upheld in Proposition 140. While there
were drafting gaffes in both measures, the effect of the term
70. Id. at 510-11.
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limits measures were clearly spelled out. The application of
the measure did not require ongoing interpretation which
would be aided by legislative history. On the other hand, the
true impact of the measure on the balance of legislative and
executive power was neither addressed nor assessed during
the campaign that resulted in the adoption of Proposition 140.
The cynics among us will suggest that the most obvious
difference is that the shift of power struck down in
Proposition 115 was a shift of judicial power. The court is
more likely to be protective of its own power than the power
of the state legislature. All the more reason why we should
insist that the principles underlying the distinction between
amendments and revisions call for neutral application. Using
a simple label like "fundamental" invites ad hoc result-
oriented determinations that disguise, rather than expose,
the underlying value judgments being made. Ultimately, the
value we are seeking to uphold is the value of rational
discourse before we make changes in our constitution with
widespread impact. The test of what is a "revision" must
include an assessment of what was lost in the elimination of
that rational discourse by the use of the initiative process.
Applying this standard, it should be readily apparent
that Proposition 24, by shifting the power to reapportion
legislative and congressional districts to the California
Supreme Court, would have violated the prohibition of
constitutional revision as well as the single subject rule. The
immersion of the supreme court in partisan politics would
have had a devastating effect upon the independence of the
court, and infected the process of appointing and confirming
Justices of the court with all the worst elements of party
politics. In my view, the constitutional infirmity of the
initiative on this ground was even stronger than the claim
that it violated the single subject rule. Apparently, one
reason the court in Jones may have confined its analysis to
the single subject challenge was that it felt it was on firmer
ground in granting pre-election review on the single subject
claim.
The Report and Recommendations of the California
Commission on Campaign Financing include several changes
in the prohibition of constitutional revisions by initiative.
First, the Commission suggests that, since the legislature can
propose constitutional revisions, there seems to be no reason
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why the public should not be able to propose constitutional
revisions. This, of course, ignores the value of the open
legislative process over the secretive drafting of initiatives in
creating a legislative history. The only context in which the
legislature has ever exercised its power to propose
constitutional revisions was in the context of the work of the
Constitutional Revision Commission which motivated the
granting of the power in the first place. The Commission also
proposes a 5,000 word limit on initiatives, and a requirement
of a super-majority of sixty percent or approval at two
successive elections for initiatives to amend the constitution.
While both of these proposals may have substantial merit,
they do not really address the fundamental difference
between constitutional revision and other amendments to the
constitution.
VI. PRE-ELECTION REVIEW
The greatest impact of Jones may ultimately be in
cracking open the door to pre-election review of initiatives.
How wide should the opening be? The standard enunciated
in Brosnahan I, that pre-election review is precluded absent a
"clear showing of invalidity,"" has clearly been abandoned.
The court in Jones concluded: "[W]hen a court determines
that the challengers to an initiative measure have
demonstrated that there is a strong likelihood that the
initiative violates the single subject rule, it is appropriate to
resolve the single subject challenge prior to the election."" A
"strong likelihood" is less than a "clear showing," but it is
certainly reasonable to ask why there should be any
difference at all between the standard of proof applied in pre-
election and post-election challenges. If a presumptive
threshold is to be overcome, should not it be higher after the
voters have already indicated their approval of a measure?
Regardless of how the burden of proof is defined, it is clear
that judges are very reluctant to invalidate an initiative after
the voters have approved it-probably more reluctant than
they might be in a pre-election challenge. Unlike the
situation in which a court is assessing the appropriateness of
a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of a party
prevailing on the merits, the court deciding a pre-election
71. Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 4 (1982).
72. Senate v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 1154 (1999) (emphasis added).
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challenge will decide whether a "strong likelihood" of a
violation exists at the same time that it decides that a
violation has or has not occurred. If a pre-election challenge
is rejected because there is no "strong likelihood" of success,
can it really be imagined that a post-election challenge will
succeed? Would it not make more sense to simply decide the
pre-election challenge on the merits, and then preclude post-
election review of the question altogether? One commentator,
noting that most states preclude post-election procedural
attacks altogether, or impose a higher burden of proof on
post-election challenges, has suggested that post-election
review of procedural challenges should be precluded
altogether in California, in the absence of a showing that a
pre-election challenge was impossible, impracticable or
otherwise futile.73 While I would not go that far, I fail to see
any logical basis or practical value for the "strong likelihood"
prerequisite to pre-election challenges. In reality, it operates
as the standard for any procedural challenge, substantially
diluting the protection afforded by the single subject rule and
the prohibition of constitutional revision.
Jones actually limited its "strong likelihood" standard to
single subject challenges, leaving open the possibility that the
higher "clear showing" standard might still be applied to
challenges based on the prohibition of constitutional revision.
There does not appear to be any reason to place greater limits
on pre-election constitutional revision challenges than are
imposed on single subject challenges, other than potential
severability. A successful constitutional revision challenge
may only knock out a severable portion of an initiative
measure. 74  A single subject violation, on the other hand,
requires complete rejection of the entire measure 75 because
the constitutional prohibition provides, "An initiative
measure embracing more than one subject may not.., have
any effect."
76
In noting the decisions subsequent to Brosnahan I that
had permitted pre-election review of procedural issues, the
73. See Howard Eastman, Squelching Vox Populi: Judicial Review of the
Initiative in California, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 529, 552 (1985).
74. See, e.g., Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (1990) (upholding the
bulk of Proposition 115 while invalidating the "omnibus repealer" as a
constitutional revision).
75. See Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1142.
76. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
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court in Jones concluded that the general rule against pre-
election review "does not preclude preelection review when
the challenge is based upon a claim, for example, that the
proposed measure may not properly be submitted to the
voters because . . . it amounts to a constitutional revision
rather than an amendment."77 The court cited to McFadden
v. Jordan,"5 which invalidated the "Ham and Eggs" initiative
as a constitutional revision in a pre-election challenge.
Although the Jones court was careful to note that McFadden
found that the measure in its entirety was a constitutional
revision, the availability of severance of a constitutional
revision can be addressed in a pre-election challenge just as
effectively as in a post-election challenge. In fact, pre-election
severance would be preferable, since it would eliminate any
doubts that some voters may have voted for the initiative only
because it included the invalid constitutional revision.
Both single subject challenges and claims of
constitutional revision can be expeditiously litigated with
very little evidence. The main focus for either claim is on the
language of the initiative itself. Even if Professor
Lowenstein's "public understanding" test gains further
ground, the evidence can be submitted in declarations, and
much of it might even be judicially noticed. The similarity of
the issues raised under both claims suggests judicial
efficiency would be enhanced if single subject and
constitutional revision challenges were combined in one
proceeding.
The advantages and disadvantages of pre-election versus
post-election review of initiatives have been thoroughly
analyzed elsewhere." The greatest obstacle to expanded
availability of pre-election review, however, will be the
problem of judicial resources. In her dissent in Jones, Justice
Joyce Kennard decried the "extraordinary" rush to decision
which required expedited briefing (two weeks) and allowed
only three court days between oral argument and the filing of
the decision. ° Chief Justice Ron George responded in a
footnote, asserting: "[T]his court historically has
demonstrated its ability and willingness to resolve matters
77. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1153.
78. 32 Cal. 2d 330 (1948).
79. See Douglas C. Michael, Pre-election Judicial Review: Taking the
Initiative in Voter Protection, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1216 (1983).
80. See Jones, 21 Cal. 4th at 1169 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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expeditiously when circumstances so require, without
compromise to the deliberative process, both in election and
nonelection matters."'" Even at the highest levels, however,
expeditious review may not always produce soundly reasoned
opinions.82 If the California Supreme Court had to muster the
kind of performance it delivered in Jones several times each
year, the court might encounter serious difficulties in keeping
up with its normal caseload. Jones was only the sixth case in
fifty years in which the California Supreme Court granted
pre-election review of an initiative measure." If pre-election
challenges are freely permitted to assert any plausible claims
that a measure violates the single subject rule or the
prohibition of constitutional revision, the California Supreme
Court could easily have five or six expedited cases on its
docket every year to resolve these issues. But that would
occur only if the supreme court insisted on hearing all of
these cases itself. There is no reason why many of these
claims could not be resolved in the intermediate courts of
appeal. One of the recent court of appeals decisions which the
Jones court looked to for "important guidance," in fact, was
the pre-election challenge invalidating the "Insurance Cost
Control Initiative of 1988.""4 The parties could present
expedited petitions for review of the court of appeals decision
to the supreme court, which could then either deny a hearing,
resolving the matter, or vacate the court of appeals ruling and
reserve the question for post-election resolution. Relief might
also be afforded by moving the deadlines for qualification of
an initiative for the ballot, to give the courts more time to
hear pre-election challenges.
In Florida, pre-election review for compliance with the
single subject requirement is required once an initiative has
gathered ten percent of the signatures necessary to place it on
81. Id. at 1156 n.10 (citations omitted).
82. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
83. Previous cases were McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330 (1948); Perry v.
Jordan, 34 Cal. 2d 87 (1949) (pre-election decision rejecting single subject
challenge); Assembly v. Deukmejian, 30 Cal. 3d 638 (1982) (pre-election
challenge to referenda on reapportionment statutes); Legislature v. Deukmejian,
34 Cal. 3d 658 (1983) (pre-election challenge invalidating initiative allowing
second legislative redistricting in ten year period); and American Federation of
Labor v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 697 (1984) (pre-election challenge invalidating initiative
which violated federal constitution).
84. California Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. Eu, 245 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1988).
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the ballot.85 One California proposal would require the
Attorney General to review proposed initiatives to determine
if there is "substantial doubt" whether they comply with the
single subject requirement or constitute a revision of the
constitution. If the measure subsequently qualifies for the
ballot, the Attorney General would be required to file a pre-
election challenge in the supreme court.86 Doubtless there are
many other innovations which could be considered to alleviate
any overload that broader availability of pre-election
challenges might create.
Press reports in the wake of Jones suggest that the
number of pre-election challenges to initiatives has already
increased." The crack in the door may attract a parade of
petitioners, but the fact that lots of petitioners have a valid
claim for relief should never be viewed as justification for
courts to close their doors. Even five or six pre-election
challenges a year will hardly overwhelm the California court
system. But five or six initiatives every election that violate
the single subject rule or revise the constitution could very
well overwhelm California's voters. The growing complexity
of the California ballot may be a strong factor in the
disappointing decline in voter turnout in California elections.
VII. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court decision in Jones should
send a strong message to the industry that drafts and
promotes initiative measures as California's "fourth branch"
of government. The door has been opened to greater use of
pre-election review of procedural challenges to initiatives,
lowering the threshold from the previously required "clear
showing" of invalidity to a "strong likelihood" of invalidity.
The requirement that initiatives embrace a single subject has
finally grown some teeth because of the court's willingness to
look beyond the language of the initiative itself to extraneous
evidence of "logrolling," and due to the analysis of the
potential for voter confusion or deception that closely
resembles the "public understanding" test proposed by
85. See CCCF, supra note 45, at 322.
86. See Michael, supra note 79, at 1234, 1237. If the pre-election challenge
was unsuccessful, however, this could create a conflict that would disqualify the
Attorney General from defending the initiative after its enactment.
87. See Tyler Cunningham, More Initiatives Facing Dicey Pre-Election Legal
Battles, S.F. DAILY J., Nov. 7, 2000, at 1.
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Professor Daniel Lowenstein. The breadth of the "theme"
used to unite disparate measures will be closely assessed in
terms of its potential to render the single subject limitation
wholly nugatory.
While Jones avoided the question of whether the
initiative at issue was a constitutional revision, there are
compelling reasons to give this question the same access to
pre-election review as the single subject question, and to
enforce it with similar vigor.
These changes should be welcomed as supportive of
California's embrace of direct democracy. The growing
complexity of initiatives and the swelling ambition of their
proponents actually threaten continued public support for the
initiative process, lower the level of public participation in
elections, and inject confusion and deception into our political
discourse. Greater utilization of pre-election review will also
enhance the independence of the California judiciary, by
eliminating the perception that judicial enforcement of the
constitution contradicts the expressed "will of the people."
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